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Abstract
This paper presents an axiomatic characterization of a family of solutions to
two-player quasi-linear social choice problems. In these problems the players
select a single action from a set available to them. They may also transfer
money between themselves.
The solutions form a one-parameter family, where the parameter is a non-
negative number, t.
The solutions can be interpreted as follows: Any eﬃcient action can be
selected. Based on this action, compute for each player a "best claim for com-
pensation". A claim for compensation is the diﬀerence between the value of an
alternative action and the selected eﬃcient action, minus a penalty proportional
to the extent to which the alternative action is ineﬃcient. The coeﬃcient of pro-
portionality of this penalty is t. The best claim for compensation for a player is
the maximum of this computed claim over all possible alternative actions. The
solution, at the parameter value t, is to implement the chosen eﬃcient action
and make a monetary transfer equal to the average of these two best claims.
The characterization relies on three main axioms. The paper presents and
justiﬁes these axioms and compares them to related conditions used in other
bargaining contexts. In Nash Bargaining Theory, the axioms analagous to
these three are in conﬂict with each other. In contrast, in the quasi-linear social
choice setting of this paper, all three conditions can be satisﬁed simultaneously.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
1.1 The Problem
This paper concerns the normative analysis of two-player quasi-linear social
choice problems. In these problems, two players select a single action from a
set available to them. In addition, the players may make a payment of money
to one another. Preferences are quasi-linear in this monetary transfer — relative
evaluations of the outcomes are independent of the amount of money paid or
received.
1.2 Solutions
A solution is a function that determines the action to be implemented and the
payment to be made in each quasi-linear social choice problem. We seek solu-
tions that always result in eﬃcient outcomes and that have additional normative
properties. In quasi-linear social choice problems, eﬃciency requires that the
chosen action maximizes the sum of the players’ evaluations; ﬁnding such actions
is a straightforward calculation. The more subtle question therefore concerns
how the monetary payments should vary with the problem that is faced.
We present an axiomatic structure that characterizes a one-parameter family
of solutions. The parameter, denoted t, can take any non-negative value. The
solutions and the interpretation of t are easy to describe:
Select any eﬃcient action1 and implement it. Then consider each player
in turn. For the ﬁrst player, and for each possible action, make the following
computation: Take the diﬀerence between his evaluation of this action and
the implemented action. Subtract t times the amount by which this action
is ineﬃcient — that is the quantity of money which, if added to the combined
payoﬀ of the two players, would make this action as eﬃcient as the one that
has been selected. Maximize this diﬀerence over all the actions2. Think of
the resulting quantity as the ﬁrst player’s proposal for a transfer of money in
1If there is more than one, any can be selected. The solution, in the utility space, will be
invariant to this selection.
2The maximal diﬀerence must be non-negative because if the action in question were equal
to the implemented action, both terms would be zero.
2his favor. Now make the same calculation for the second player; think of the
result as the second player’s proposal. The solution, at the parameter value t,
is to implement the selected eﬃcient action, and to make a monetary transfer
equal to the average of these two proposals.
1.3 Interpretation of Solutions and the Parameter t
The procedure outlined above gives a method for calculating the result of any
solution obeying the axioms we propose. It describes this result as if there
were a procedure for making and adjudicating claims for compensation. Yet
the approach of this paper is entirely normative. The axioms describe desirable
qualitative properties of solutions and do not mention "claims", "compensation"
or "proposals" in any way. These terms help us understand the solutions and
elucidate their behavior as the problem varies but are not part of the theory
itself.
Monetary payments can be interpreted as compensation paid by one player
to another for the latter’s having forgone the opportunity to chose a diﬀerent
decision — one that this latter player would have preferred but which is ineﬃcient
for the group as a whole. For this reason we call the monetary payment a “com-
pensatory transfer”. In general, as can be seen from the calculation described
above, both players may have a justiﬁable claim for a compensatory transfer.
The parameter t represents a quantitative measure of the inﬂuence of "ineﬃ-
cient forgone alternatives" on the recommended result. A high value of t means
that the solution tends to be less sensitive to such alternatives, and transfers
will tend to be small in absolute value. A low value of t means that a player
will be well-compensated when his favorite alternative is not selected. At t =0
the transfer will depend only on the maximal evaluation that each of the two
players gives to any action.3
>From the nature of the calculation method described, another property of
solutions can easily be seen. The solution will depend only on the single "best
proposal" that each player has available. The addition, deletion, or modiﬁcation
of actions that do not aﬀect these two "best proposals" or the eﬃcient selected
action will necessarily leave the recommended outcome unchanged.
1.4 Applications
Quasi-linear social choice problems have a wide range of application. Cost
allocation is one important area where they have been used4. In cost allocation
problems, the payoﬀs are usually thought of as negative — eﬃcient actions are
those that result in the least negative aggregate payoﬀ.
3As discussed below in sections 1.6.4 and 6.1, the solution at t =0does not survive a
natural strengthening of our continuity axiom. It is the only member of the one-parameter
family characterized in Theorem 13 that fails this test. Thus, in some sense, this solution is
a limiting case of the solutions with t>0 w h i c ha r et ob ep r e f e r r e do nt h e o r e t i c a lg r o u n d s .
See Theorem 16.
4See Moulin[24] and Young[52], for a full discussion. Also Moulin[21] in Arrow, Sen and
Suzumura[1], Champsaur[5], Kaneko[17], Loehmann and Whinston[18], and Chun[7][8][9].
3Many collective decisions in multi-division businesses or in multi-jurisdiction
governmental settings ﬁt naturally into the framework of this paper. The
players are divisions, localities, or administrative units. One level higher in
the organization than these "players" is a central authority that would like the
players to take eﬃcient decisions and to allocate the costs and beneﬁts of these
decisions equitably and consistently across problems. A related application is
the allocation of corporate proﬁts to divisions for reporting purposes.
We are also interested in using this model to evaluate the behavior of actual
pairs of bargainers and of individuals who are called upon to make ethical judg-
ments concerning problems faced by others. One of the advantages of having
described a one-parameter family of solut i o n si st h a tw ec a nu s ee x p e r i m e n t a l
data to test the model5. If the model predicts well, we can then estimate the pa-
rameter value that is seemingly being used by pairs of bargainers or individuals
whose behavior conforms to the theory.6
1.5 Axiomatic Structure
In addition to the standard postulates such as symmetry, three other axioms
are used to characterize a family of solutions. The ﬁrst is additivity: Solving
independent problems should produce the same outcome whether they are ap-
proached separately or jointly. The second is a form of monotonicity: Consider
an action that is better for one of the players than any of the eﬃcient actions.
The existence of such an action creates an argument for a compensatory trans-
fer in favor of this player. This argument should become stronger the less
ineﬃcient is the action.
The third axiom is called Recursive Invariance.7 Recursive Invariance con-
templates a situation in which the solution is recommending that a transfer be
made in order to reach a utility allocation that is not directly feasible by the
choice of an action8. In such a situation the axiom states that the addition of a
new feasible action that happened to produce the solution’s recommended util-
ity allocation, without the need for a monetary transfer, should have no eﬀect:
the same utility allocation should be implemented. It could be reached either
by retaining the original action-transfer pair, or by adopting the new action and
making no transfers.
After formally presenting the axioms, we will argue that a failure of this
invariance property would render the solution “vulnerable to renegotiation”.
Recursive invariance is not directly comparable to any axioms used in other
5See, for example, Bar-Hillel and Yaari[4].
6See Chugh, Green and Idson[6].
7This axioms has only been stated once before in the literature. See Chun [8]. Chun’s term
for this axiom is Trivial Independence. He shows that, in combination with Pareto Eﬃciency,
it is implied by a variety of other axioms. Chun did not oﬀer any separate justiﬁcation for
Trivial Independence. His paper was concerned with monotonicity and other comparative
static properties of solutions, not with additivity. Trivial Independence was shown to be a
logically weaker assumption than other postulates that were needed for his main theorem and
w a st h u sn o ts e p a r a t e l ye x p l o r e d .
8Or a mixture of feasible actions.
4approaches to bargaining theory although it is similar in spirit to "consistency"
and "independence" axioms9.
1.6 Relationship to Prior Work
1.6.1 Normative Bargaining Theories
The normative bargaining literature falls into three groups. First, there is the
Nash [29] approach, in which a feasible set of utility allocations and a status
quo (or disagreement pont) comprise the data of the problem. Second, there
is the approach of games in characteristic function form10,i nw h i c ht h ed a t ao f
the problem are the total utilities that each subset of the players can achieve on
its own. Third, there is the quasi-linear social choice framework.11
The Nash framework allows the feasible set of utility allocations to be an ar-
bitrary convex set. This allows for risk-averse players. In contrast, in the quasi-
linear framework and in games in characteristic function form, risk-neutrality
with respect to monetary transfers is assumed.
The disagreement point plays a special role in the Nash framework12.I n
games in characteristic function form, the utility outcome where each player
obtains the payoﬀ he would receive if he were acting alone frequently plays
the role of the disagreement payoﬀ. In contrast, in the quasi-linear social
choice model, if there were a status quo ante representing the situation before
bargaining begins, implementing that point and making no transfer of money is
t r e a t e do nap a rw i t ha l lt h eo t h e rp o s s ible outcomes. It is not regarded as a
"threat point", or given any other special role.
Quasi-linear social choice problems embody a two-level treatment of the
utility possibility set. Some of the allocations result directly from the choice
of an action, with no transfers being made. Other allocations can be reached
only with non-zero transfers. The utility possibility set is a half-space — the set
of all utility allocations whose sum is less than or equal to the maximal amount
that can be achieved. The solution, lying on the boundary of this half-space,
depends on the set of utility allocations that are reachable without the use of
transfers. In this sense, the utility allocations that are induced directly by the
choice of an action enjoy a diﬀe r e n ts t a t u s ,a n dh a v em o r es a l i e n c ew i t h i nt h e
theory, than those that are reached by the superposition of a monetary transfer
upon a real decision. This distinction between the way in which feasible utility
9Classic references on consistency and related ideas include Aumann and Maschler[3],
Moulin[27], Peters[30], Roth[34], Schmeidler[38], Sobolev[40], and Thomson[43][47].
10We will restrict attention here to the transferable utility case. In this case, there is the
implicit assumption of quasi-linearity of utilities — although the underlying set of actions and
their evaluations are not usually mentioned in the analysis. See, for example, Aumann[2],
and Roth[35]. For a discussion of games in characteristic function form without transferable
utilities see Hart[14].
11These three approaches operate directly in the utility space. There is a fourth family of
models as well — those that use information on how a utility allocation is achieved, as well as
on what the utilities are. See Roemer [33] for an extensive discussion.
12See Peters[30] and Schmitz[37].
5allocations are attained is not used in either the Nash-type theories or in games
in characteristic function form.
While the two-level treatment of the feasible set might seem contrary to the
utilitarian tradition, it is an essential part of the formulation of the problem we
have posed. Consider the simplest possible problems in our domain — those in
which there is only one possible action. A solution to these problems should
not impose any monetary transfer because the role of transfers is to create
equitable compromises based on the relationships between the action that is
actually chosen and other actions that could have been chosen. However,
in these simple problems the utility-possibility set is a half-space, as always.
Only in the presence of ineﬃcient foregone actions is there a need for transfers,
and hence the theoretical necessity for our two-level treatment of the utility-
possibility set.
The use of distributional information is another way in which the analysis of
games in characteristic function form diﬀers from that considered here. Each
coalition is summarized by a single number, representing the best that that
group can do acting on its own. What is not stated or used in the analysis is
what the distribution of this maximal payoﬀ among the members of the coalition
would be.
To summarize: Games in characteristic function form use information about
payoﬀs for independent subgroups, whereas our analysis uses only the possibil-
ities for both players acting in concert. Our theory neglects "threat points" or
other results obtainable by individuals acting alone.13 At the same time, we
do use information about the individual player’s payoﬀs that would arise at all
the decisions that could be made — both the ineﬃcient and the eﬃcient actions
— whereas this distributional information is irrelevant to the analysis of games
in characteristic function form.
1.6.2 Comparison of Axiomatic Structures and Results Obtained
The axioms in this paper are related to axioms that have been used elsewhere in
the normative bargaining literature, either in the Nash or characteristic function
frameworks, or in quasi-linear social choice theory. A full discussion will be
given below, after the axioms have been presented formally. At this point, we
will only highlight the diﬀerences in the results obtained.
The major diﬀerence between the results in this paper and those of other
models, either those in the Nash framework or in games in characteristic func-
tion form, is that in the present context all the axioms can be simultaneously
satisﬁed. In the Nash framework, the additivity axiom and the monotonic-
ity axiom are in direct conﬂict, in the presence of the other standard axioms.
An axiom related to additivity is used to characterize the superadditive solu-
tion, see Maschler and Perles [19]. Monotonicity is used to characterize the
13Theories that are intended for application in organizations that have longevity, where
many decisions will be faced over time that will be handled the same way, should not be
based on threats to defect and destroy the organization. See the remarks below in Section
1.6.3 on local and situational justice.
6Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, Kalai and Smorodinsky [16]. These solutions are
diﬀerent; thus the axioms are contradictory14.
In games in characteristic function form, the monotonicity axiom cannot be
stated precisely in the form we use it. Nevertheless, an informal comparison of
the spirit of the results can be given. For games in characteristic function form,
Young[51] has shown that a form of monotonicity, called strong monotonicity,
can be used to characterize the Shapley Value. Indeed, this characterization
does not make use of additivity — which was Shapley’s route to this solution.
In our framework, monotonicity does not imply additivity. However, as in the
case of the Shapley Value, the two properties can be satisﬁed simultaneously.
In the framework of this paper, monotonicity and additivity characterize a
fairly large set of solutions — see Theorem 12. One additional axiom, Recur-
sive Invariance, narrows the set of solutions down further to the one-parameter
family discussed above. This is the main result — see Theorem 13. A nat-
ural strengthening of the continuity requirement eliminates only one of these
solutions — see Theorem 16.
Theorem 18 presents the interpretation of the solutions characterized in The-
orem 13 in terms of averages of the best proposals of the players, adjusting these
proposals in proportion to the level of ineﬃciency that would be entailed. This
interpretation gives rises to the tax-based formula described above.
1.6.3 Relationship to Social Choice Theory
The type of collective decision problem considered here is very diﬀerent from
that in much of classical social choice theory. The problems for which our
theory is appropriate are those in which the decision to be taken is isolated
from other factors aﬀecting the players involved. In contrast, social choice
theory takes a more global perspective. Particular decisions are not isolated.
Everything is compressed into the idea of an all-inclusive "social state". These
social states can be evaluated by the players, and this evaluation is interpreted
within social choice theory as the players’ overall welfare level. In social choice
theory, typical axioms relate to how an individual evaluates his or her own
welfare. Some theories allow for comparisons of one’s own welfare to that of
others, or to the welfare that would be achieved if the real outcomes that are
given to others were instead received by the player in question. Achieving
fairness, eﬃciency and consistency, across both people and situations, are the
goals. By abstracting from the particular details of a social decision problem,
social choice theory gains its strength, generality and normative force.
In contrast to social choice theory, the theory developed here does not make
reference to overall outcomes. The idea is simply to be fair "locally" — using
as a reference only the outcomes relevant to the decision at hand. How well or
badly situated the participants are in the remainder of their experiences is not
a part of this analysis15. The idea is only to be fair in so far as the decision at
14In the presence of the additional requirements for eﬃciency and invariance to the numerical
representation of the preference ordering.
15Indeed, since the "players" may not be comparable to each other comparative equity
7hand is concerned. For this reason, Elster [11], Sen [39], Young [50] and others
have used the terms "local justice" or "situational justice" to describe the spirit
of models such as the one presented in this paper.
1.6.4 Prior Work on Quasi-linear Social Choice Problems
Prior work on quasi-linear social choice problems has identiﬁed several classes
of solutions. With one exception, all these solutions diﬀer from those in this
paper. The exception is the solution called Equal Allocation of Non-Separable
Alternatives (EANS), which has a long history in the context of cost allocation16.
This solution corresponds to the special case of t =0in our one parameter family
of solutions, as characterized in Theorem 13 and interpreted in Section 517.
As it turns out, the EANS solution is the only member of the family we
characterize that is eliminated by the strengthening of our continuity axiom in
Theorem 16. All the solutions corresponding to t ∈ (0,∞) satisfy this stronger
continuity axiom — but they will in general diﬀer from EANS.
Both Moulin[23] and Chun[7] formulate axioms that focus on the behavior
of the solutions as the number of participants vary. In their models the set
of actions is ﬁxed, although the players’ evaluations of these actions can vary.
Dubins[10] uses an axiom that relates to the incentive properties that solutions
would possess if they were played as non-cooperative games. With the sole ex-
ception of Equal Allocation of Non-separable Surplus, the solutions determined
in these papers do not satisfy the additivity hypothesis discussed above.
In contrast to these approaches, the solutions deﬁn e di nt h i sp a p e ra r e
explicitly meant to apply only to two-player situations in which the outcome is
determined cooperatively, with full information about the payoﬀsa n dt h e r e f o r e
no incentive problems. The number and nature of the actions is variable across
problems and is not constrained.
1.7 Outline of This Paper
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 presents the axioms and discusses
them in more detail. Properties of solutions are presented in Section 4, which
contains all the principal results. In Section 5 we interpret these results in
terms of "claims", adjusted for "ineﬃciency" by means of "taxes", as discussed
above. A geometrical construction of solutions is also given in this section.
Section 6 collects various comments and comparisons to other work and discusses
extensions and open problems arising from this research. Proofs of two main
results are in Section 7. Proofs of the other lemmas and theorems are either
straightforward or follow immediately from the discussion in the text. Several
ﬁgures follow.
considerations may not be relevant, or even meaningful. For example, the players may be
divisions of a ﬁrm with entirely distinct functional responsibilities, very diﬀerent in size or in
their composition of employment.
16See Ransmeier[32], Straﬃn and Heaney[41], and Moulin[27].
17See the remarks about the solution with t =0in Section 1.3 and footnote 3 above.
82 The Model
The two players are denoted by i =1 ,2.A p r o b l e m i s a s e t B ⊂ R2 that is
closed, convex, comprehensive and bounded above. The set of all problems is
denoted B.
For each B ∈ B,l e t¯ x(B)=maxx∈Bx1+x2.L e tH(B)={z ∈ R2|z1+z2 =
¯ x(B)}.
A solution is a function f : B → R2.
The interpretation of a solution f is that when f is applied to a problem B,
the ﬁnal utilities received by the players are f(B)=( f1(B),f 2(B)).O u r ﬁrst
axiom, eﬃciency, will require that f(B) ∈ H(B). The utility outcome f(B)
can be achieved by selecting an action producing x ∈ B ∩H(B) and by making
at r a n s f e ro fm o n e yt =( t1,t 2),w i t ht1 = −t2, such that fi(B)=xi + ti ,f o r
i =1 ,2.
93A x i o m s
If ξ =( ξ1,ξ2) ∈ R2 denote by π(ξ) the vector (ξ2,ξ1) ∈ R2. Similarly, if
X ⊂ R2,d e n o t eb yπX the set {(ξ1,ξ2) ∈ R2|πξ ∈ X}.
If X ⊂ R2 and X is bounded above, deﬁne the comprehensive hull of X as
the smallest set in B that contains X, and denote it by K(X).
The ﬁrst four axioms are entirely standard:
Axiom 1 Eﬃciency (E): A solution f satisﬁes eﬃciency if for all B ∈ B,
f(B) ∈ H(B).
Axiom 2 Anonymity (AN): A solution f satisﬁes anonymity if for all B ∈ B,
πf(B)=f(πB).
Axiom 3 Continuity (C): A solution f satisﬁes continuity if it is continuous
in the Hausdorﬀ topology on B.
Axiom 4 Independence of Utility Origins (IU): A solution f satisﬁes indepen-
dence of utility origins if for all x ∈ R2,a n da l lB ∈ B, f(B+{x})=f(B)+x.
Eﬃciency, anonymity and continuity require no further comment. Indepen-
dence of utility origins expresses the idea that the solution should depend on the
relative evaluation that each individual has of the various actions. The evalu-
ation scale used in a numerical representation of a quasi-linear utility function
is determined only up to an additive constant. This constant should not aﬀect
the real aspects of the solution — the selection of the action to be taken and the
transfers to be made18.
The ﬁrst question one might ask is whether compensatory transfers should
be paid at all. Why not simply select (the midpoint) of the set of eﬃcient
alternatives B ∩ H(B) and leave it at that?
This "no transfer solution" is eliminated by the four axioms above. Consider
a sequence of problems with only two actions, an eﬃcient action which remains
ﬁx e d ,a n da ni n e ﬃcient action which is improved throughout the sequence until,
in the limit, its payoﬀ converges to a diﬀerent point than the eﬃcient action,
but one that is equally eﬃcient. If throughout this sequence no transfers were
paid the solution would be at the eﬃcient point. By continuity, in the limiting
case it would remain at this point. However, by anonymity and independence
of utility origins, the solution in the limiting case should be the average of the
payoﬀs of the two actions. Never making any transfers would thus result in a
discontinuity at this limit. Positive monetary transfers must be paid in at least
some cases.
18Independence of Utility Origins plays the same role in our theory as Independence of
Linear Transformations of Utility Scales plays in Nash-type theories. Numerical representa-
tion of the preferences, incorporating free parameters with no behavioral meaning, should not
aﬀect the real bargaining results.
10We will present three more axioms, which together with the four axioms
above will characterize a one-parameter family of solutions. These axioms,
Additivity, Monotonicity, and Recursive Invariance, will be imposed seriatim,
in this order. At each step, we obtain a family of solutions that are easy
to describe. The ﬁrst axiom is well known; the second is closely related to
monotonicity axioms used in other bargaining models but has not been pre-
viously applied in quasi-linear social choice theories; and the third has been
mentioned in the literature only once before, but has not been used in a char-
acterization theorem19.
Axiom 5 Additivity (AD): A solution f satisﬁes additivity if for all B1,B 2 ∈
B, f(B1 + B2)=f(B1)+f(B2).
The additivity axiom is commonly used in games in characteristic function
form, where it characterizes the Shapley Value. A related axiom, called super-
additivity, is used in Nash Bargaining Theory, where for the two person case it
characterizes the Maschler-Perles [19] solution.20
The justiﬁcation for additivity is based on considering those special pairs
of problems that do not interact at all. In such pairs, preference over actions
in each problem are invariant to the action taken in the other. Pairs of non-
interacting problems can be combined into a composite problem. Each action
in the composite problem is actually a pair of actions, one chosen in each of
the original problems. Additivity is simply the requirement that the players
should be indiﬀerent as to whether independent problems are solved separately
or jointly. Further justiﬁcation for this axiom is presented in Myerson[28],
Roth[34], Maschler and Perles[19] and Peters[31].
Axiom 6 Monotonicity (M): A solution f satisﬁes Monotonicity if f1(K({(0,0)}∪
{(1,−x)})) is non-increasing in x,f o rx = 1.
Monotonicity is related in spirit to various monotonicity axioms in the bar-
gaining literature21, but has diﬀerent implications arising from the structure of
quasi-linear social choice problems. The intent of this axiom is capture the
ethical spirit of a process in which monetary transfers are paid to a player who
can make a good argument, to a neutral observer, that he has "forgone" the
prospect of decisions that would have been better for him, in favor of one of the
collectively eﬃcient decisions. Such an argument should be stronger when the
forgone alternative is less ineﬃcient, but no less beneﬁcial to this player.
19See footnote 7 above.
20However, this solution exists only for the case of n=2, see Maschler and Perles[20]. On
the other hand, in the present model, the axioms E,AN, C, IU, and AD can be satisﬁed for
any n. Indeed there are inﬁnitely many solutions that do so, see Green[12].
21See Kalai-Smorodinsky [16], Moulin[27], Roth[36], Thomson[44], Thomson and
Myerson[45], and Young[49], [50].
11Insert Figure 1 here
N o ww ec o m et ot h eﬁnal axiom:
Axiom 7 Recursive Invariance (RI): A solution satisﬁes recursive invariance
if for all B ∈ B, f(K(B ∪ {f(B)})) = f(B).
Recursive Invariance is based on the idea that when players agree to use a
solution f they are committing themselves to a process that imposes monetary
transfers in order to compensate each other for forgoing alternatives that would
have been preferred but which might not be eﬃcient. The players are agreeing
to make a transfer that results in f(B) recognizing that this allocation may
n o tb ef e a s i b l et h r o u g ht h ec h o i c eo fa na c t i o na l o n e . R e c u r s i v eI n v a r i a n c e
embodies the idea that the players already regard f(B) as a fair outcome when
the underlying possibilities are B. Having committed themselves to a process
that results in this outcome, the players should still consider f(B) to be a just
result if a means of achieving it directly, without the use of transfers, were added
to the feasible outcomes already in B.
Recursive Invariance can also be interpreted as a form of renegotiation proof-
ness condition. Imagine that after B becomes known, but prior to the actual
implementation of any outcome or transfers, the players enter into a renegoti-
ation. At this stage, given that the players have agreed to use the solution f,
f(B) has the same status as all the points in the original B —i ti sa no u t c o m e
that can be selected without the need for any further monetary transfers. If
f(K(B ∪ {f(B)})) 6= f(B) the players would be rejecting the recommendation
of the solution f at this stage, renegotiating their original commitment to use
f even though nothing real has changed.
Insert Figure 2 here
124 Constructing Solutions
The construction of solutions is based on a simple geometrical idea. Problems in
B can all be written as the sum of sets in a very simple subfamily — the subfamily
of B in which there are only two outcomes. Once the solution is ﬁxed on this
subfamily, it can be extended to all of B using the additivity axiom.
The Monotonicity and Recursive Invariance axioms restrict the behavior
of solutions on this subfamily. These restrictions have implications for the
behavior of solutions on all of B w h i c ha r ee x p r e s s e di nt h em a i nc h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n
theorems.
To implement this approach to the construction of solutions, some additional
notation will be useful.
Let B0 ⊂ B be the set of B ∈ B with ¯ x(B)=0 ,a n d(0,0) ∈ B.
For x = λ>0,l e tC1(λ,x)=K({(0,0)} ∪ {(λ,−x)}) and C2(λ,x)=
K({(0,0)}∪(−x,λ)}). The subfamily consisting of all sets Ci(λ,x) for i =1 ,2
— problems with only two outcomes — will form the basis of solutions on B0.
These solutions can then be extended to all of B.
The next three lemmas give precise statements of these ideas.
Any B ∈ B0 can be approximated by a ﬁnite sum of the form
P
j=1,...,J C1(λ
1
j,x 1
j)+
P
j=1,...,J C2(λ
2
j,x 2
j). An exact decomposition of B ∈ B0 as a sum of sets each
of which is generated by a problem with only two actions is given by:
Lemma 8 For each B ∈ B0 there exists a pair of non-negative measures µB
1 ,µ B
2
on [1,∞) such that
B =
Z
C1(1,x)dµB
1 (x)+
Z
C2(1,x)dµB
2 (x)
Anonymity and additivity give rise to the translation invariance of solutions,
w h i c hc a nb ee x p r e s s e da s :
Lemma 9 I ffs a t i s ﬁe sE ,A N ,C ,a n dI U ,f(K({x})) = x for all x ∈ R2
As a consequence of Lemmas 8 and 9, given the value of a solution on the
sets Ci(1,x),f o ri =1 ,2 and x = 1,w ec a nﬁnd the solution to any problem
B ∈ B by translating B by a vector −x such that x ∈ B ∩ H(B), resulting in
as e tB0 ∈ B0. Then, the solution f(B0) is computed using Lemma 8, and the
original problem B is therefore solved at f(B0)+x This process is summarized
in Lemma 10:
Lemma 10 If f : B0 → R2 satisﬁes E, AN, C, IU and AD on B0,t h e nf can
be uniquely extended to B.
13Given a solution f let gf :[ 1 ,∞) → R be deﬁned by
gf(x)=f1(C1(1,x))
Given a function g :[ 1 ,∞) → R, Lemma 8 implies that g generates a solution
f via the relation:
f1(B)=
Z
g(x)dµB
1 (x) −
Z
g(x)dµB
2 (x) for all B ∈ B0
We can characterize a family of solutions F that are consistent with AN, C,
AD and any additional axioms, by determining the properties that the associ-
ated gf must satisfy for any f ∈ F under these axioms.
Lemma 11 Given any continuous function g :[ 1 ,∞) → R , such that g(1) = 1
2,
there exists a unique solution f satisfying E, AN, C, IU and AD such that
gf(x)=g(x) for all x ∈ [1,∞).C o n v e r s e l y , i f f is a solution satisfying E,
A N ,C ,I Ua n dA Dt h e ngf is continuous and gf(1) = 1
2.
Lemma 12 If f is a solution satisfying E, AN, C, IU, AD and M, then gf is
continuous, non-increasing and gf(1) = 1
2. Conversely, if g :[ 1 ,∞) → R is any
continuous, non-increasing function with gf(1) = 1
2, the solution f : B → R2
that is generated from g, will satisfy E, AN, AD, C, IU and M.
Lemma 12 follows directly from the statement of the monotonicity axiom.
The main result of this paper is the characterization of the set of solutions
satisfying Recursive Invariance, in addition to the axioms previously imposed:
Theorem 13 If f is a solution satisfying E, AN, C, IU, AD, M and RI, gf :
[1,∞) → R satisﬁes either:
(i) There exists x∗ > 1 such that
gf(x)=1
2 − 1
2( x−1
x∗−1) for x 5 x∗
gf(x)=0 for x>x ∗
or
(ii)
gf(x)=1
2 for all x ∈ [1,∞). Conversely, all the solutions generated from
functions g satisfying (i) and (ii) are consistent with the axioms, E,AN,C,IU,M
and RI.
The proof of Theorem 13 is in Section 7.
14The continuity axiom (C)a ss t a t e di sb a s e do nt h ei d e at h a ti fp a y o ﬀsf r o m
a given set of actions are perturbed slightly, there should be only a slight change
in the resulting utilities. We will now introduce a slight strengthening of the
continuity idea with a diﬀerent motivation: Actions that result in extremely
ineﬃcient payoﬀs should have little weight in determining the outcome. The
mathematical way of expressing this idea is as follows:
Take a sequence of sets Bi.I f t h e r e e x i s t s B ∈ B such that for every compact
set X ⊂ R2, Bi ∩ X converges in the Hausdorﬀ topology to B ∩ X, we will say
that Bi converges to B. A topology, which we call the bounded convergence
topology, is deﬁned by this family of converging sequences.
The continuity axiom can be strengthened to:
Axiom 14 Axiom C*: The solution f is continuous in the bounded conver-
gence topology.
Lemma 15 If the solution f satisﬁe sE ,A N ,C * ,I U ,A Da n dM ,t h e nt h e
function gf that represents f satisﬁes: limx→∞gf(x)=0
Theorem 16 If f is a solution satisfying E, AN, C*, IU, AD, M and RI, then
there exists x∗ ∈ (1,∞) such that gf :[ 1 ,∞) → R satisﬁes:
gf(x)=1
2 − 1
2( x−1
x∗−1) for x 5 x∗
gf(x)=0 for x>x ∗
155 Characterizations of Solutions in Terms of Taxes
on the Ineﬃciency of Claims
In this section we oﬀer an interpretation of Theorem 13 in terms of "best claims
for compensation", as discussed in the introduction.
For each x∗ > 0 and x = 0,l e tgx∗
(x)=m a x ( 1
2 − 1
2( x−1
x∗−1),0).D e -
ﬁne the solution f(B;x∗) as the solution generated from gx∗
by f1(B,x∗)= R
gx∗
(x)dµB
1 (x) −
R
gx∗
(x)dµB
2 (x).
Take any x0 ∈ B ∩ H(B).F o r e a c h t = 0 deﬁne
ft,x0(B)=x0 +( 1 /2)[(y∗
1(B,t),−y∗
1(B,t)) + (−y∗
2(B,t),y∗
2(B,t))]
where y∗
i (B,t) a r et h ev a l u eo ft h ep r o b l e m s
maxx∈B(xi − x0
i) − t(¯ x(B) − (x1 + x2))
for i =1 ,2.
Lemma 17 The solution ft,x0(B) is independent of the choice of x0 ∈ B ∩
H(B).
T h e r e f o r ew ec a nd e ﬁne ft(B)=ft,x0(B).
Theorem 18 For each x∗ > 0,t h es o l u t i o nf(B;x∗) is equal to the solution
ft(B) for t = 1
x∗−1.
The solution generated from g ≡ 1
2 is equal to the solution f0(B).
The limiting case, where t is 0, corresponds to x∗ →∞and part (ii) of the
conclusion of Theorem 13: gf(x) ≡ 1/2. In this solution, no decrease in the
claim of either player is applied due to the ineﬃciency of a superior forgone
alternative. This is the Equal Allocation of Non-Separable Surplus solution.
(See the further discussion in Section 6.1 below.)
The geometry of the solutions are shown in Figure 3.T h e e ﬃcient point
is x0 =( 0 ,0). Both of the players have superior forgone alternatives. If their
payoﬀs in these two alternatives are adjusted in accordance with the "tax" t,
their "best claims" for compensation are the points y1 and y2. The solution,
therefore is f(B)=x0 + 1
2(y1 + y2),a si n d i c a t e d .
Insert Figure 3 here
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6.1 Comparison to Other Solutions
Moulin[23] discusses three classes of solutions to quasi-linear social choice prob-
lems. The ﬁrst is simply to choose an eﬃcient action and to make no transfers
at all. This method necessarily produces discontinuities in the utility outcomes
in the neighborhood of problems where there is more than one eﬃcient decision.
(See the discussion above in section 3.)
The second class of solutions is called Equal Sharing Above a Convex Refer-
ence Level22. These methods produce outcomes that depend on the description
of the problem in ways other than the set of utilities reached by an action
choice. For example, adding other actions whose induced utilities duplicate
those already in the feasible set will aﬀect the solution.
The third solution is called, in the cost allocation literature, Equal Allocation
of Non-Separable Costs. The EANS solution is obtained by computing best
results that can be attained by coalitions of n − 1 players if they could choose
the action without reference to the results of the omitted player: Deﬁne v−i =
maxx∈B
P
j6=i xj. Then the separable cost (or beneﬁt) ascribed to player i is
si =m a x x∈B
P
j=1,...,n xj − v−i. The EANS solution gives each player the
payoﬀ si plus an equal share of the diﬀerence between the aggregate of these
payoﬀs and the amount available to the group — the "non-separable costs".
Thus player i receives 1
n[maxx∈B
P
j=1,...,n xj +
P
j6=i v−j]− n−1
n v−i under the
EANS solution. In the two player situation studied in this paper, the EANS
solution gives player 1 1
2[maxx∈B(x1 + x2)+m a x x∈B x1 − maxx∈B x2].T h i s
solution is precisely the solution we obtain when t =0 .
Take the set of problems deﬁned by Bx = K{{(0,0)},{(1,−x)}} for x>1.
For all these problems, EANS recommends the allocation (1/2,−1/2),n om a t t e r
how large x becomes. All the solutions we characterize, for any t>0,c o n v e r g e
to (0,0) as x →∞ . We view this convergence as reasonable because a very
ineﬃcient alternative such as (1,−x) for x large, should not cause much of a
transfer to be paid. This is the justiﬁcation for Axiom C* and the resulting
restriction to t>0 obtained in Theorem 16. (See Figure 4.)
Insert Figure 4 here
6.2 Testing and Estimating Bargaining Solutions
This paper has been entirely normative in character. Nevertheless, as is the case
with other normative ideas in economics, it is interesting to see if experimenal
subjects, faced with this type of problem, behave in a manner consistent with
this theory.
In Chugh, Green and Idson[6] we examine whether the presence of ineﬃcient
forgone alternatives aﬀects the direction and magnitude of monetary transfers
22This is class is also explored in some detail by Chun[7][9]
17in one-time encounters between pairs of people. We obtain clear evidence
for this eﬀect. We are performing also trials where individuals are asked for
their normative evaluation about outcomes that are "proposed" for hypothetical
problems faced by two other bargainers. We test whether such a judge is well-
modeled by a solution of the form described in this paper, and if so we estimate
the value of t that they seem to be using. In future work we hope to show the
value of t depends on the context of the bargaining setting and on other social,
demographic and behavioral information about the people involved.
6.3 Cost Allocation Problems
The model presented above can be extended to cost allocation problems. In cost
allocation problems the model is augmented to associate a total cost to every
action, in addition to the evaluation that the two players have for the action.
Transfers are then required to sum to (the negative) of the cost of the eﬃcient
action that is implemented. Thus the ﬁnancing of the collective decision is
incorporated into the system of compensatory transfers that is associated with
the selected eﬃcient action.
A problem is a set of points x =( x0,x 1,x2) ∈ R3, with the interpretation
that x0 is the negative of the cost of the associated action, and that xi is the
beneﬁto ft h i sa c t i o nt oe a c ho ft h et w op l a y e r s ,i =1 ,2. The comprehensive
hull B of these points in R3 is used to summarize the problem. Under the
usual "free disposal" and "probability mixture" hypotheses, allowing costs to
be higher and beneﬁts to be lower that those speciﬁed at each action, the set
of all problems is the family B of closed, convex, comprehensive subsets of R3
that are bounded above.
Eﬃciency is the requirement that x maximizes x0 + x1 + x2 over B.L e t
¯ x(B) be the value of this maximand, which is the value of the beneﬁts in excess
of cost at an eﬃcient action.
A solution is a mapping f : B →R2, such that f1(B)+f2(B)=¯ x(B) for all
B ∈ B. This restriction incorporates the sharing of costs into the transfers, as
fi(B)=xi + ti and f1(B)+f2(B)=¯ x(B)=x0 + x1 + x2 imply t1 + t2 = x0.
The one parameter family of solutions studied above satisfy the natural
generalization of all the axioms in this non-zero cost framework. Any eﬃcient
action can be selected, resulting in the beneﬁts x∗
i and the cost -x∗
0.B e g i n f r o m
the payoﬀs where the cost at the eﬃcient action are shared equally, resulting in
payoﬀs x∗
i +
x∗
0
2 . Then, compute the claim yt
i of each player according to the
value of the problem
maxx∈B(xi + x0
2 ) − (x∗
i +
x∗
0
2 ) − t(¯ x(B) − x0 + x1 + x2)
The solution, at the parameter value t is (ft
1(B),ft
2(B)) = (x∗
1 +
x∗
0
2 +
yt
1−yt
2
2 ,x ∗
2 +
x∗
0
2 +
yt
2−yt
1
2 ).
186.4 More Than Two Players
Unlike the extension of our basic model to problems with non-zero costs, the
extension to more than two players is anything but trivial. The problem is not
that there are no solutions, but rather that there may be others that satisfy the
axioms as well.
Consider the subfamily of problems in which all actions are equally eﬃcient
and where the maximal possible for the group as a whole is zero. In the case of
n =2 , these problems are trivial: The solution is the midpoint of the eﬃcient
segment of B.
If we were to apply the idea of the solutions obtained above to the case
of n>2,t h ev a l u eo ft would be irrelevant because all alternatives are equally
eﬃcient, and all solutions would give player i the payoﬀ 1
n
P
j6=i maxB
P
k6=j xk−
n−1
n maxB
P
k6=i xk at every problem in this class23.
The solutions that reach this payoﬀ are not, however, the only solutions
that satisfy the additivity axiom on this family of problems. One example of a
solution that can take a diﬀerent value on some problems is obtained by deﬁning
a game v in characteristic function form as v(S)=m a x x∈B
P
i∈S xi and letting
the solution be the Shapley value of v. Indeed, the results in Green[12] show
that there are an inﬁnity of values that can be taken on by additive solutions
in this class of problems.
The reason for this diﬀerence in the results can be traced to the method of
proof used above in the case of n =2 . We decomposed problems in B into
a sum of problems involving only two actions (recall Lemma 8). Therefore to
ﬁnd solutions satisfying Additivity we needed only to specify the solutions on
the very simple subfamily of "two-action" problems, which is the role of the
function g above. Once we generated all additive solutions from this function
of one variable, the other axioms were used to restrict g. It is this idea that
does not generalize to larger n. In spaces of larger dimension a typical member
of B cannot be written as the sum of such a very simple family of problems.
There is, therefore, quite a bit more ﬂexibility available to the "design" of an
additive solution.24
The Monotonicity and Recursive Invariance axioms deal with problems in
which not all actions are eﬃcient. At present it is not known whether all
members of the class of solutions identiﬁed by Green[12] for the "all-actions-
eﬃcient" case can be extended to the general case in a way that preserves
Monotonicity and Recursive Invariance. This remains one of the principal
questions for further research in this area.
23Using the constant sum property of the feasible set, i’s payoﬀ c a na l s ob ew r i t t e na s
minB xi − 1
n
P
j=1,...,n minB xj.
24Mathematically, the question is related to problems in the theory of convex polytopes.
See Grünbaum[13]
197 Proofs
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 3
If g(y) ≡ 1
2 we have (ii) in the statement of the theorem. If there exists y
such that g(y) > 1
2, we have a violation of the Monotonicity axiom. Assume
therefore that there exists y>1 such that 0 <g (y) < 1
2.B y t h e d e ﬁnition of
g we have,
f(K({(0,0)} ∪ {(1,−y)})) = (g(y),−g(y)) (1)
By RI,
f(K({(0,0)} ∪ {(g(y),−g(y))} ∪ {(1,−y)})) = (g(y),−g(y)) (2)
Express the argument of f on the left hand side of (2) as the sum of two sets
in B0 :
K({(0,0)} ∪ {(g(y),−g(y))} ∪ {(1,−y)}) (3)
= K({(0,0)} ∪ {(g(y),−g(y))})+K({(0,0)} ∪ {(1 − g(y),g(y) − y)})
By IU and AN
f(K({(0,0)} ∪ {(g(y),−g(y))})=(
g(y)
2
,−
g(y)
2
) (4)
Substituting (3) into (2) and using (4) we have .
f(K({(0,0)} ∪ {(1 − g(y),g(y) − y)})) = (
g(y)
2
,−
g(y)
2
) (5)
Now apply the same argument to
K({(0,0)} ∪ {(
g(y)
2
,−
g(y)
2
)} ∪ {(1 − g(y),y− g(y))}) (6)
Decompose the argument of (6) as in (3):
K({(0,0)} ∪ {(
g(y)
2
,−
g(y)
2
)} ∪ {(1 − g(y),g(y) − y)}) (7)
= K({(0,0)} ∪ {(
g(y)
2
,−
g(y)
2
)})
+K({(0,0)} ∪ {(1 − g(y) −
g(y)
2
,y− g(y) −
g(y)
2
)})
Therefore,
f(K({(0,0)} ∪ {(1 − g(y) −
g(y)
2
,y− g(y)
−g(y)
2
)})) =
g(y)
4
(8)
20Recursively,
f(K({(0,0)} ∪ {(1 − g(y)(2 −
1
2n),y− g(y)(2 −
1
2n))})) =
g(y)
2n+1 (9)
Taking the limit as n →∞ ,w eh a v e ,
f(K({(0,0)} ∪ {(1 − 2g(y),y− 2g(y))})) = 0 (10)
or
(1 − 2g(y))g(
y − 2g(y)
1 − 2g(y)
)=0 (11)
Now, since 0 <g (y) < 1
2,
g(
y − 2g(y)
1 − 2g(y)
)=0 (12)
Let
x∗ =
y − 2g(y)
1 − 2g(y)
(13)
Taking n large and recalling that 1 <yand 0 <g (y) < 1
2 (9) implies that
g(x) > 0 for a sequence of points xn approaching x∗ from below. Therefore, by
virtue of the Monontonicity axiom,
x∗ =i n f{x|g(x)=0 } (14)
Beginning this argument from any y such that g(y) > 0, we see that (13) holds
independent of the value of y selected. Thus,
x∗ =
x − 2g(x)
1 − 2g(x)
for all x<x ∗ (15)
Solving (15) over its domain of validity, we obtain,
g(x)=
1
2
−
x − 1
2(x∗ − 1)
for all x<x ∗ (16)
Thus, for the case where there exists y with g(y) < 1
2, it remains only to
show that g(x)=0for x>x ∗. Suppose to the contrary that there exist y>x ∗
with g(y) < 0. Now (2)] holds independent of the sign of g(y). However,
because g(y) < 0,
K({(0,0)} ∪ {(g(y),−g(y))} ∪ {(1,−y)}) (17)
= K({(0,0)} ∪ {(g(y),−g(y))})+K({(0,0)} ∪ {(1,−y)})
Applying AD and AN,
f(K({(0,0)} ∪ {(g(y),−g(y))} ∪ {(1,−y)})) = (
g(y)
2
,−
g(y)
2
)+( g(y),−g(y))
(18)
which contradicts (2).
¥
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